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The strange death of Number Controls in England: paradoxical adventures in 
higher education market making 
Abstract 
 
The paper analyses the impact of a higher education funding mechanism, the 'High 
Grades' policy, introduced as part of a student number control regime in England that 
was introduced in 2012/13 and withdrawn after only two years. This marked the end 
of an experiment in market making based on quality and price within a fixed student 
number cap. The paper analyses the impact of policy in key areas of institutional 
behaviour which taken together illustrate why the specific higher education market 
mechanism failed. The focus will be on two key areas of institutional behaviour which 
taken together illustrate why the specific higher education market mechanism failed, 
and how longer term marketisation is affecting the different institution types in the 
sector in ways inimical to equity and social justice. The two areas are: 1) strategic 
responses by selective universities (pre-1992s1) to the 'high grades' policy reform 
and its impact on attempts to protect subject breadth and widening participation 
(WP); 2) the market pressure felt by post-1992 universities to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors due to the demands of institutional league tables. 
These in turn illustrate the ways that longer term marketisation is affecting the 
different institution types in the sector in ways inimical to autonomy, equity and social 
justice.  
Keywords: social justice; policymaking; English higher education; number controls; 
marketisation; differentiation 
 
1. Introduction 
In December 2013 in his Annual Autumn Statement the UK Chancellor George 
Osborne announced the end of the Student Number Control (SNC) regime for 
                                            
1
 The terms pre- and post-1992 universities are used in the UK context to differentiate the 40 universities in 
existence prior to 1992 and those created after the Further and Higher Education Act (1992) which had mainly 
been Polytechnics or Colleges of Higher Education. These were HE institutions that did not have their own 
degree awarding powers (and thus could not be defined as universities) prior to the 1992 Act, hence 'post-1992s'. 
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English2 higher education institutions, thereby removing the cap on places which had 
been in place since 2009 and prefiguring a demand-led system from 2015-16 (HM 
Treasury 2013). This marked the end of an experiment in market making based on 
quality and price. Using data from a national research project (funded by the Higher 
Education Academy) this paper explores some of the key issues affecting the 
operation of the number control policy regime from the perspective of senior 
institutional policymakers in the months before it was abandoned. Was the policy, 
and specifically the 'high grades' element of the Student Number Control regime 
always destined to fail in terms of creating a price differential between institutions?; 
or was it only designed to last for two academic years as a prelude to a further 
liberalisation of the of the market to full competition?  
In November 2010, following the publication of the Browne Review of HE finance, 
the new Coalition Government announced an increased upper limit to variable tuition 
fees of £9,000 per year of study and a more progressive repayment regime, along 
with a new student support scheme, the National Scholarship Programme (BIS 
2011a) to replace mandatory OFFA bursaries (HEFCE 2012; McCaig 2011a). Once 
HEIs had set their tuition fees for 2012/13 (in March 2011) it became clear that fees 
had been set at a rate above the system-wide average (£7,500) that government 
modelling declared optimal to make the new system affordable. Government 
responded by issuing a White Paper Students at the Heart of the System (BIS 
2011b) at the centre of which was a student number control regime designed to 
incentivise lower average tuition fees and create a meaningful differentiation that 
would reflect quality and demand. 
The paper analyses the impact of the student number control policy in two key areas 
of institutional behaviour which taken together illustrate why the specific higher 
education market mechanism failed, and how longer term marketisation is affecting 
the different institution types in the sector in ways inimical to equity and social 
justice. The two areas are: 1) strategic responses by selective universities (pre-
1992s3) to the 'high grades' policy reform and its impact on attempts to protect 
                                            
2
 Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales have devolved responsibility for HE financing and are not considered in 
this paper 
3
 The terms pre- and post-1992 universities are used in the UK context to differentiate the 40 universities in 
existence prior to 1992 and those created after the Further and Higher Education Act (1992) which had mainly 
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subject breadth and widening participation (WP); 2) the market pressure felt by post-
1992 universities to differentiate themselves from their competitors due to the 
demands of institutional league tables. The paper concludes by highlighting the 
systemic stresses and distortions created by number controls which by December 
2013 had made the 'high grades' regime dysfunctional even in its own terms and 
thus unworkable for pre-1992s. At the same time the combination of the longer term 
marketisation of the system and the student number control regime affected post-
1992s in two ways: by endangering widening participation and reducing the diversity 
of this part of the sector - paradoxically, given the market pressures to differentiate. 
2. Systemic growth and differentiation 
The English higher education sector has grown rapidly in recent decades following a 
period of stagnation from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. With the return of 
economic growth and a relaxation of controls on the number of student places the 
age participation ratio (APR) (i.e. the proportion of 18-year-olds in the population in 
HE) more than doubled between 1988 and 1992 from 15% to 33% (Shattock 2008, 
p.192). Growth continued at a slower pace and had reached 37% APR by the time 
the Labour Government entered office in 1997 with a widening participation target of 
50% of 18-30-year-olds to have experienced higher education by 2010 (McCaig 
2000). Using a wider HE initial participation rate (HEIPR) measure (of 18-30 year 
olds) to replace APR from 2008, the proportion was 42% when Labour left office in 
2010 (HEFCE 2010). A cap on places was introduced by the government in 2009, 
and despite its continuation under the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government from 2010, the proportion of young people entering higher education 
had reached 49% by 2013, albeit from a smaller number of 18-year-olds in the 
population (HEFCE 2013a).  
During the long-term growth period participation has widened as well as increased. 
That is, that the proportion of those groups historically under-represented (those 
from lower social classes, low participation neighbourhoods (LPNs) some black and 
minority ethnic (BAME) groups, those from the social care system, disabled and 
                                                                                                                                       
been Polytechnics or Colleges of Higher Education. These were HE institutions that did not have their own 
degree awarding powers (and thus could not be defined as universities) prior to the 1992 Act, hence 'post-1992s'. 
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mature students) has risen4. For example, the participation gap between the lowest 
and highest social classes and the most and least deprived areas had narrowed 
between 1995 and 2012 (HEFCE 2013b). However this widened participation was 
largely limited to participation in institutions with lower UCAS5 tariff points for entry 
(HEFCE 2010). The distribution of students among HEIs in England based (roughly) 
on achievement (i.e. entry grades) has become a key marker of system 
differentiation and the underlying basis for the market reforms discussed in this 
paper.  
The process of differentiating the English HE sector began with the establishment of 
the Higher Education Funding Council for England to oversee the newly unified 
sector. The ending of the 'binary' system of higher education (between independent 
universities and public sector Polytechnics in 1992) created a system of 130 
universities, and within two years so called 'mission groups' had begun to emerge 
(the Russell Group and 1994 Group of selective universities were both founded in 
1994), at least in part to differentiate their members within the system. The HEFCE's 
own foundation mission statement aimed to "encourage diversity in the provision of 
higher education" and to "encourage institutions to build on their strengths" (HEFCE 
1994) be they local, regional or international. Differentiation - the need to establish a 
place in the crowded market and encourage diversity - was therefore officially 
encouraged from the beginning of the unification process and has continued into the 
present period (see for example HEFCE 2000; DfES 2006; BIS 2011b; McCaig 
2011a; 2011b; Dodds, A 2011).  
3. Students at the Heart of the System 
The overarching aim of Students at the Heart of the System was to make the sector 
more responsive to student demand, and thus more differentiated, through the 
application of market forces. Markets were to work in three main ways:  
                                            
4
 WP cohorts, made up of those from underrepresented groups, have been supported by additional institutional 
payments from HEFCE since 1991. WP as a national policy agenda was the subject of Aimhigher and Lifelong 
Learning Network funding streams until 2011 and 2010 respectively, with the main emphasis on collaborative 
outreach and information, advice and guidance support targeted at school and colleges with low levels of 
participation.  
5
 UCAS is the UK wide University and College Application System. It has created a tariff system which enables 
equivalence to be calculated among the various qualifications used for HE entry. UCAS tariff points are one of 
the key indicators used by league tables to indicate the quality of courses and, by extension, institutions. 
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First, variable tuition fees up to a new maximum of £9,000 were designed to open up 
a fee differential between those institutions that most satisfy the wants of students 
and those that least satisfy them. Combined with a liberation of student numbers 
hitherto distributed on the basis of 'block grant' in the form of capped quotas from the 
Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) which institutions received 
"year-on-year regardless of what students think about the quality of teaching" 
(Browne 2010, 23), the fee market would reward excellence, and provide incentives 
for others to improve:  
The changes we are making to higher education funding will … drive a more 
responsive system. To be successful, institutions will have to appeal to prospective 
students and be respected by employers. Putting financial power into the hands of 
learners makes student choice meaningful (BIS 2011b, 5) 
For those institutions unable to justify high fees as applicants chose to study 
elsewhere, new providers would be licensed to compete with them on price for 
student places. In the new regime, where the future of institutions is more closely 
related to students' judgements and choice: "We expect our reforms to restore 
teaching to its proper position, at the centre of every higher education institution’s 
mission" (BIS 2011b, para 2.7).  
Second, the provision of market information to enable applicants to make more 
informed choices is central to Students at the Heart of the System. The dynamism 
expected to be generated by increased student choice would then find fruition in a 
wider range of learning modes and a greater focus on teaching quality. The White 
Paper proposed that the public availability of comparative standardised information 
on courses in Key Information Sets (KIS) (BIS 2011b, para 2.10) and other sources 
of public information would empower students to make more informed choices. HEIs 
were also encouraged to have student charters to encode the entitlements, 
expectations and responsibilities of staff and students.  
Third, student number controls and exemptions for high achieving applicants. The 
system of student number liberation introduced by the White Paper was designed to 
reduce the student number control allocation for each institution (although leaving 
the number of students that could be recruited unchanged) in two ways. Firstly, a 
'high grades' market effect was created by exempting the highest achieving 
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applicants (those with AAB or equivalent and above in 2012-13 and those with ABB 
and equivalent or above from 2013-14) from student number controls (BIS 2011b 
para 4.18). This allowed institutions to recruit as many students with high grades "as 
they wish, and are able to, outside of their student number control" (HEFCE 2013a), 
thus reducing the number of students with grades below AAB/ABB6. Secondly, the 
'quality and value' part of the policy enabled the removal of another 20,000 places 
reserved for providers willing to offer HE at (or below) £7,500 per year of study (thus 
attempting to match quality and price on the basis of 'value for money'). This margin 
was reduced to 5,000 places for 2013-14, although these were an additional HEFCE 
allocation of places. The combined effect of the 'high grades' and 'quality and value' 
margins was to reduce by a third the total places available within the overall numbers 
cap, potentially squeezing the SNC allocations to institutions unable to attract those 
with the highest grades or unwilling/unable to lower tuition fees (McGettigan 2013; 
UCAS 2013).  
The remainder of this paper explores two aspects of the implementation of this 
policy: the impact of the specific short-term 'high grades' market mechanism within 
the SNC (which mainly affected pre-1992s), and the wider impacts of longer term 
marketisation of the system on post-1992 institutions.  
4. Methodology and method 
The research used a mixed methods design incorporating a national survey and 
subsequent in-depth semi-structured interviews with a selected representative of a 
sample of different HEI types. Analysis in this paper focuses on pre- and post-1992 
categories of institution as this is a key marker for differentiation. This mixed 
methods design enabled a quantitative, comparative, national analytic mapping to be 
followed by small-scale qualitative research which generated significant detail, depth, 
and specificity. The design thus enabled the production of a more finely-grained and 
nuanced account than quantitative or qualitative approaches alone would provide 
(Ritchie and Lewis 2003). The research was funded by the Higher Education 
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 Part-time students were also exempted from student number controls 
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Academy via an open call on the theme of the 'changing landscape of English higher 
education'7. 
The initial stage took the form of a survey of senior managers in all English 
universities and further education colleges with significant HE provision. The census 
cohort was Higher Education Academy contacts at pro-vice-chancellor level (HEA 
PVC Network) and their equivalents in the further education college sector8. The 
survey was carried out during April and May 2013 with an overall response rate of 
19% of 173 institutions surveyed. Follow up interviews were carried out face-to-face 
by the authors during the Autumn of 2013 and in total our qualitative analysis was 
based on the contribution of 17 individuals from 13 institutions.  
 
The research set out to map the impact that changes in student number controls and 
increased fees were having on the student profile and the student learning 
environment. Detailed research questions were focussed on: whether institutions 
plan to change how and what they provide; whether changes would imply a shift in 
the type/quantity of student study support (e.g. for employability, retention etc); and 
the extent and nature of any changes in subject offer (i.e. course closures) or level 
(e.g. withdrawal from sub-degree, funding of post-graduate programmes). 
 
In this paper attribution uses the following protocol: data from selective pre-1992 
institutions is labelled Pre1, 2, 3 etc; from post-1992 institutions Post1, 2, 3 etc. In 
some cases the attribution also indicates area of responsibility, for example Pre1, 
planning gives an indication of the operational role of the respondent. This is used 
where: it clarifies the perspective of the interviewee; it clarifies the context in which 
the response was given; and to differentiate where the views of more than one 
person from that institution were gathered. 
                                            
7
 The report Evaluating the impact of number controls, choice and competition: an analysis of the 
student profile and the student learning environment in the new higher education landscape, Higher 
Education Academy, York, August 2014 can be found at: 
https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Impact%20of%20number%20controls%20
choice%20and%20competition.pdf 
 
8
 Our analysis of the impact on the FE college sector will be the subject of a separate paper. 
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5. Analysis 
At the outset we asked respondents about the extent to which institutions were 
responding to the White Paper's drive for further differentiation. In our survey almost 
two-thirds of all institutions (61.8%) were planning to further differentiate themselves 
within the sector, though this masks the fact that 83% of post-1992s and only 25% of 
pre-1992s felt under this pressure. This is interesting given that half of respondents 
also expected very little in terms of additional student numbers from such strategies, 
and supports the notion that - as we may expect in marketised conditions - 
enhancing institutional differentiation is a strategic goal in itself, regardless of 
potential financial rewards (Brown and Scott 2009; Maringe and Foskett 2009).  
For our respondents the measure and means of differentiation was most commonly 
articulated in relation to mission group/institutional focus for 84%; with 63% citing 
league table rankings; 58% the National Student Survey (NSS) and 47% the 
Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (DLHE). Pre-1992 institutions were 
more likely to cite mission group as the key to differentiation; post-1992s were more 
likely to cite league table rankings.  
For post-92s one of the key areas where they could enhance differentiation from 
competitors was by emphasising employability (again this partly reflects the 
requirements of OFFA access agreements which from 2012-13 included set targets 
for employability measures (OFFA 2011; McCaig 2015). When asked which personal 
characteristics of their student body were most liable to be negatively affected by the 
new tuition fee and number control regime, 62% of respondents selected age, 46% 
lower socio-economic class and those from low participation neighbourhoods; in 
each case these fears were felt more strongly among post-1992 respondents (Table 
1).  
Table 1. Likely changes to your institution's student profile in terms of enrolments on 
the basis of? (N = 33) 
Student characteristics liable to change All % post92 % pre92 % 
Gender 8 14 0 
Age 62 71 29 
Lower Socioeconomic Class 46 50 43 
Low Participation Neighbourhood data 46 50 43 
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Ethnicity 19 29 14 
Disability 4 7 0 
Merit (e.g. higher than required entry 
requirements, better 23 29 29 
Need (e.g. Residual Household Income of 
less than £25k) 23 21 43 
Looked after Children (Children in care) 12 14 14 
Shortage subjects (e.g. STEM) 23 29 29 
 
So in conditions where differentiation is taken to mean merely moving upwards in the 
league tables at the expense of other similar institutions there is some support for 
the notion that differentiation may actually reduce the diversity of the sector's student 
body, particularly in that part of the sector that is currently the most diverse.  
Looking specifically at price differentiation, our findings suggests that the decision to 
abolish student number controls from 2015-16 and move towards an open market 
was an acknowledgement that SNC had led to unintended and unforseen negative 
consequences, not least of which was the fact that a price differential (the key 
rationale of the White Paper) had not even begun to emerge. The market effect had 
failed to materialise: why then did the market fail? Or rather, why did government 
lose patience with their experiment of increasing flexibility? Part of the answer was 
simply that demand for higher education places still exceeded supply (given the cap 
on numbers), with acceptances up to a record level (UCAS 2013) and average fee 
levels for 2014-15 (£8,600) were also closer than ever to the maximum (HEFCE 
2013b). 
Even at the higher achieving end, demand remained high in those post-1992 
institutions because many of the equivalent-to-ABB qualifications are higher grade 
BTECs that have often not been considered for access to more prestigious 
institutions (UCAS data in Grove, 2013). However, they are accepted by post-1992s, 
which consequently attracted enough exempt High Grade students in addition to 
their SNC to offset the loss of those with ABB and above at A level. This was seen 
by respondents as an important reason why post-1992s were not pressurised into 
lowering their tuition fees. 
Overall in the first two years of the new financial regime and the operation of the high 
grades policy there had been little redistribution in student numbers from one part of 
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the sector to another (despite the fears of many in the post-1992s as we discuss 
below). Instead, high grades redistribution had largely taken place between pre-1992 
institutions as HEFCE's own analysis of the distribution of AAB+ students had 
anticipated prior to the introduction of the high grades mechanism (HEFCE 2011). 
This found that of 22 HEIs that enrolled over 50% of students with AAB+ profiles in 
2011, 17 were members of the (pre-1992) Russell Group or 1994 Group and the 
other five were specialist colleges of higher education covering the arts, dance and 
music. The situation was also clouded by the fact that applicants with A-levels were 
(and remain) a declining demographic (HEFCE 2015; Morgan 2013; Matthews 2013) 
and partly as a consequence selective pre-1992 institutions were accepting a higher 
proportion of lower qualified students (i.e. BBB or below) than in previous years 
(UCAS 2013). Given this context our interviews focused on the strategies employed 
by pre-1992s in particular to maximise the number of high grades students.  
6. The strategic uses of student number controls by pre-1992s  
The design of the student number control regime from 2012/13 inevitably led to the 
greatest impacts affecting those institutions looking to increase their share of higher 
grade students. For pre-1992s the immediate impact was a realisation that their core 
allocation - SNC - was becoming a minor part of their overall undergraduate intake. 
The problem of the rapidly shrinking core SNC was that those numbers were not 
always evenly distributed around the provision these institutions wished to offer, nor 
was the core always reported to be sufficient to allow them to continue to meet their 
wider institutional mission or their statutory requirement to make places available to 
EU students if more places went to applicants with higher grades. Two major, and 
sometimes overlapping, strategic approaches were used by pre-1992 institutions to 
manage number controls: those designed to maintain a commitment to widening 
participation (as required by their OFFA access agreements); and those designed to 
maintain the breadth of provision.   
Pre-1992s: protecting widening participation 
While it should be noted that there is no necessary correlation between candidates 
with sub-ABB profiles and widening participation students, they are statistically 
under-represented in selective pre-1992 institutions which take on most students 
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with the higher grades (OFFA 2010; HEFCE 2013c). Many commentators feared that 
the new regime of SNCs was likely to exacerbate inequalities of access 
(Independent Commission on Fees 2013; McGettigan 2013; McCaig 2014). 
However, there is in fact little correlation between the subjects that WP students 
apply to study and the subjects that are least likely to require 'high grades'. Often our 
respondents noted that the distribution of ABBs was skewed heavily towards some 
disciplines (Sciences, Subjects Allied to Medicine) that recruit relatively strongly from 
those with WP backgrounds, while other disciplines popular with those from non-WP 
backgrounds (Arts and Humanities, the Social Sciences for example) are less likely 
to recruit those with ABB or above simply because these grades are not often 
required for entry, even at pre-1992s.  
In order to protect WP, pre-1992 institutions made two strategic changes to the way 
students were selected and how departments dealt with sub-ABB applications: a 
widening of the geographical scope of outreach; and a move towards more 
centralisation of the admissions process. The importance of widening the scope of 
outreach and widening participation work meant that, as for Pre1 (based in the north 
of England) "the Recruitment Team has got to work with schools on a national 
basis". In some cases this has led to a concentration of outreach work in the London 
and south east regions given the higher propensity of young people from those 
regions to progress to higher education. For one pre-1992 this tendency to widen the 
geographical range has led to the development of virtual open days and virtual fairs 
with input from academic staff (Pre1, widening participation).   
The issue of maintaining a commitment to WP became steadily more apparent in the 
second year of SNC. One pre-1992 respondent noted that in 2012-13 "we were 
admitting 50%-60% of applicants with A-levels at AAB or above and [in 2013-14] 
80% or so of applicants with A-levels with ABB or above" (Pre1, planning) thus 
squeezing the core SNC. The effect was further exacerbated by the decline in the 
number of 18-year-olds in the population, which one respondent pointed out was 
actually being used by government as an endorsement of the number control policy 
(as more applicants got into their first choice of institution): "but of course everyone 
has got into their first choice because there are fewer students [presenting with A 
levels]" (Pre1, planning). 
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The second key strategic change was to shift responsibility for number allocations 
away from academic departments, in effect centralising the admissions function. This 
meant departments no longer had the freedom to adjust their own minimum 
admissions criteria to fill places. For example, one pre-1992 institution noted that:   
Last year we allocated SNC out to departments and I think that caused a fair bit of 
concern, if you like, when it was being done because everybody was fighting for the 
numbers, but actually it didn’t necessarily work in the most effective way. So this year 
the numbers we kept as …. a central pot and allocated on … a needs basis rather 
than just because a department wants them and I think that is probably the way it will 
continue (Pre1, widening participation). 
Another pre92 institution which had a flexible admissions policy "that preferences 
WP applicants where possible" by making them either lower offers or being 
"preferenced for a standard offer", found that it had to change practices by the 
second year of SNC: 
Prior to 2012 entry academic schools could choose for themselves whether they 
wanted to make a lower offer or not … which meant in effect that academic schools 
shouldn’t waste lower offers if they didn’t need to (Pre2, widening participation). 
This enabled the redistribution of places from the centre to other provision, in this 
case to subject areas more likely to attract a WP intake.  
Pre-1992s: maintaining subject breadth 
As noted above, strategies designed to protect WP and those designed to maintain 
subject breadth often overlap for pre-1992s. Many of the most prestigious institutions 
also see it as part of their mission to offer programmes of study in subjects that, as 
we have noted, do not always require ABB+ even at some Russell Group 
universities, such as Modern Foreign Languages, Education, Social Work, 
Archaeology and the Arts. These subjects are in high demand from applicants whose 
choice is meant to drive the expansion of provision (BIS 2011b, para 1.4 p.14; para 
4.13, p.48) and who want to attend prestigious institutions in order to study them. 
Given this situation, pre-1992 respondents often found the mechanism of number 
control difficult to accommodate alongside notions of autonomy and transparency: 
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The capacity is different by programme, and we'd already gone to ABB as 
standard and some programmes are clearly A* and even the programmes which 
take A*s/As, still have some SNCs because you still get absolutely excellent 
students coming in that don't meet the equivalent measures. So there's always a 
small number even on those programmes. The trouble is that if you just push into 
that area there are some areas which strategically are not going to recruit large 
numbers at ABB+ and equivalent … So clearly we need to strategically use that 
(Pre3). 
We have some areas of the university which are in subjects which, again 
historically, have not recruited as strongly as others. It's harder to get good 
computer scientists or sociologists than it is to get good lawyers and economists 
… (Pre2) 
The corollary of this is that for some pre-1992 institutions the shrinking core 
allocation threatened the persistence of subject breadth, the very essence of a 
university (Collini 2012). As one senior planner said (italics added for emphasis): 
At the moment the university takes a very strong view that we're a broad-based 
university … at the moment there's no discussion around the possible closure of 
any particular subject area (Pre2, planning). 
One manifestation of this noted by senior managers at institution Pre3 was an 
increasing awareness of a decline in the uptake of Modern Foreign Languages 
(MFL) at secondary school level which was feeding into enrolments. The conclusion 
drawn was that the Russell Group's list of 'facilitating subjects'  (Russell Group 2011) 
was causing pupils to focus on just a few of the facilitating subjects, to the detriment 
of languages (even though they are included in the facilitating subjects list): 
So when I've talked to schools, this is local schools, they were saying they're 
already detaching at GCSE and that the eight facilitating subjects … are 
becoming more popular where there's a choice and that's, I think parental 
influence. So in that sense you see a narrowing of the choice at GCSE which 
can only feed on to A-level (Pre3). 
For pre-1992s, then, the impact of the 'high grades' part of SNC was clearly more 
mixed than may have been anticipated by government. Senior institutional 
policymakers spoke of increasing complexity around the allocation of a shrinking 
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core and how this has been reflected by a tendency towards a more centralised 
admissions decision-making process and the removal of a degree of flexibility of 
offer. While autonomous departments could historically reserve places offered on the 
basis of predicted A level grades9 for those that did not meet the required grade, the 
'high grades' policy in effect restricted recruitment only to those that meet the grade. 
In the new conditions the spare numbers (i.e. those places reserved for applicants 
that unexpectedly did not achieve ABB+) were taken back by the centre to use either 
for subjects likely to attract a WP intake (and thus allow institutions to meet Access 
Agreement targets), for EU students or for subjects the institution wishes to offer, 
despite low numbers of highly qualified applicants.  
7. Strategies employed by post-1992 institutions: responding to the 
wider effects of the market 
Most post-1992 institutions, as noted above, do not recruit a high proportion of 
exempted High Grades applicants and were consequently less directly affected by 
the attempted redistribution of student numbers from one part of the HE sector to 
another. However they were affected by longer term marketisation trends 
accelerated by the SNC regime and the discourse and language of the White Paper, 
such as the perceived need to move 'up-market'. This was manifested in several 
ways: by raising their minimum entry requirements (which directly affects league 
table position); by dropping part-time and sub-degree provision (neither of which 
were subject to number controls); by closing programmes that had not recruited as 
well as previously; and by attempting to incentivise applicants with guaranteed 
offers, sometimes with financial inducements.  
Post-1992 respondents rationalised the raising of entry requirements in various 
ways. For institution Post1 it was part of a general and longer-term mission to raise 
the institution’s position in league tables. In stages from 2009-10 this institution had 
raised its average UCAS tariff points for entry from 210 to over 300 by 2013-14 
(Post1). That this is becoming a common response to market pressure was reflected 
in responses to our survey of institutions, with almost half anticipating the raising of 
                                            
9
 In the English system student places are offered by institutions on the basis of the grades applicants are 
predicted to achieve around eight months before their final grades are announced 
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thresholds; by subjects this varied from 48% raising the threshold for subjects allied 
to medicine/health-related down to 41% for Humanities and for Arts provision (Table 
2). 
Table 2. Plans to change entry threshold (UCAS tariff points) all institutions (N = 33) 
Subject discipline 
Raise Same Lower 
% % % 
Arts 41 56 4 
Humanities 41 55 5 
Social Sciences 48 48 4 
Subjects allied to medicine/Health-related 
subjects 
48 48 5 
STEM 46 50 4 
 
As we can see in Table 3, pre-1992 institutions were more likely to plan for higher 
entry requirements than post-1992s given the marketised logic of the high grades 
policy - but it is noticeable that across the five discipline areas around a third of each 
of our post-1992 respondents also anticipated raising entry requirements (Table 3). 
Table 3. Plans to raise entry threshold (UCAS tariff points) by institution type (N = 
33) 
Subject discipline 
post92 pre92 
% % 
Arts 29 60 
Humanities 38 75 
Social Sciences 38 80 
Subjects allied to medicine/Health-related 
subjects 46 75 
STEM 33 100 
 
One knock-on effect of moving up-market within a capped system is that any 
additional higher grade students replace other provision, often at the expense of the 
breadth of provision and provision that was specifically designed for less qualified 
and often mature and part-time students. The 'zero-sum' logic of moving up-market 
was seen to be at least partly driven by the anticipated loss of AAB/ABB+ numbers 
to institutions higher in the league tables. In the case of Post1 this was manifested in 
a reduction in applicants with A-levels, often accompanied by a rise in the numbers 
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applying with higher grade BTECs (also exempted in the 'high grades' policy). This 
also has its "own challenges because the success rate of students with BTECs or 
their progression rates are not the same as those with A-levels" (Post1) and this 
makes them a more risky proposition, given that post-1992s with good access 
records have been set additional targets for retention and success in the new regime 
(OFFA 2011): 
this is probably a reflection of course of what else is happening in the 
marketplace, where if other universities which are higher up the pecking order if 
you like than us, are creaming off more A-level students (Post1). 
Post-1992 respondents expressed a generalised awareness that attempting to 
attract more ABBs at the expense of the core could become a strategy with 
diminishing returns where it was adopted generally by post-92s: institutions might 
"get squeezed out of the squeezed middle" as one put it (Post1). There were also 
other considerations: the need to simultaneously maintain existing income streams in 
order to sustain the breadth and range of existing activities was often invoked, as 
was the potential impact on widening participation. The fact that some post-1992 
institutions were discussing the potential effects of relying less on their WP 
reputations was acknowledged in this candid appraisal of any future trade-off (italics 
added for emphasis): 
I think there is a pressure point [around widening participation] there because I 
know that the governors are very keen on the widening participation, widening 
access, local community role agenda, versus the fact that of course if you look at 
our numbers at the moment, we exceed all of our benchmarks on widening 
access, those from low participation neighbourhoods, BME, percentage state 
schools, mature students … So losing some of those numbers would not 
probably make a very big significant impact on that agenda per se, well in terms 
of those benchmarks anyway (Post1).  
Another interviewee was mainly concerned about the potential impact on WP from 
the combined effect of aggressive competition among similar institutions and the 
consumerist behaviour of applicants who find they achieve better results than 
anticipated: 
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I think it’s amazing how many [applicants] jump ship once they know they’ve got 
the grades. So that issue will manifest and I think we will see universities who 
wouldn’t have taken students with lower grades more amenable to doing so if 
they feel the SNC is at risk in any way and I think it will be … survival of the 
fittest, it’s going to be really quite Darwinian (Post2). 
This had led to Post2 considering making 'unconditional offers' (i.e. a guaranteed 
place whether the applicant achieved the required UCAS tariff points or not) to those 
who nominated their institution on UCAS forms. Many might see this as working to 
reduce choice for students by attempting to impose an obligation on young people 
who could potentially have gone on to more prestigious institutions; in other words 
"taking the worry away" (as it was put by Post3) may make it easier for such 
institutions to manage the admissions process and secure income streams, but 
hardly sits well with the rhetoric of informed consumers making rational choices in 
Students at the Heart of the System. Competitive pressures in this sector of the 
market were thought by many to threaten WP because of the additional imperatives 
to maintain income and demonstrate improved retention and success rates. The 
market effect meant that "the business model is absolutely simplified: recruit, retain, 
recruit, retain" (Post2). 
As noted, another effect of competition for post-1992s was the reduction of provision. 
This was most starkly rationalised by the interviewee from Post3:  
We go into quite a lot of analysis and get reports from the module leaders. 
Sometimes it's a one-off, sometimes it's a recurring problem. We've got rid of 
courses that are not performing, we've got rid of modules that, we refer to them 
as the 'grim reaper' modules that were tripping up far too many students and 
damaging their chances of really getting a good degree … I'm not exaggerating if 
I said we had probably about 500 undergraduate courses, there were different 
combinations, we now have 120 (Post3). 
While overall numbers in fact remained buoyant for post-1992s during the period and 
interviewees reported few actual instances of applicants 'trading up' to higher status 
institutions, the fear that this may happen in the future was pervasive. Therefore 
there was a certain logic for post-1992s, in particular, to anticipate this by raising 
their own entry requirements even where they doubted it will make that much 
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competitive difference and feared the potential impact on widening participation and 
subject breadth.   
8. Discussion:  Accounting for the Strange Death of Student Number 
Controls 
This most recent number controls policy may, therefore, be seen historically as a 
market intervention which failed because it focused on only a few policy levers: the 
number of students with 'high grades' attending selective pre-1992 institutions; the 
tuition fee charged by institutions; and consumer choice in the system driven by 
(supposedly) key information. Future expansion of places across the wider sector, so 
that supply exceeds demand, may indeed reduce the average tuition fee over time, 
but is unlikely to have any impact on the destinations of those with high grades, one 
of the key market effects anticipated by the policy (BIS 2011b para 4.18). We can 
only conclude that the policy was abandoned because it failed to produce the 
required market differentiation quickly enough (e.g. to reduce fees and thus public 
expenditure) because the emphasis was on the wrong policy levers and thus led to 
unintended and undesirable consequences which rendered it untenable.  
The reality of dealing with SNC challenges the assumption that the most prestigious 
institutions, the most selective provision and the most qualified applicants are all 
equally present at the pinnacle of the market. This is the assumption behind using a 
'high grades' number control policy to engineer a differentiation of tuition fees, with 
the choices of those applicants with high grades driving the system, and institutions 
able to offer higher grade places winning out in the marketplace by attracting that 
particular group of students. Meanwhile, other institutions would be obliged, by the 
pressures of the market, to lower their average tuition fees. 
Policymakers also failed to understand what HEFCE's analysis (HEFCE 2011) had 
told them at the outset, that the distribution of high grades did not completely map on 
to the distribution of Government's favoured institutions, nor did the demand from 
applicants with high grades map neatly on to the distribution of places at desirable 
institutions. Government took it as axiomatic that all the 'brightest' applicants would 
naturally wish to attend all the 'best' universities because everything pre-1992 
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institutions offered required the highest grades. Strategic responses from such 
institutions demonstrate how the harsh light of the market exposed the degree to 
which prestigious institutions - which often claim the inviolability of high entry grades 
as a reason not to 'socially engineer' places for WP students by lowering entry 
requirements - actually use the symbolic 'brand effect' of high grades very selectively 
when such discourse suits their business case (e.g. see McCaig 2015). Pre-1992s 
clearly benefitted from the often fallacious confluence, encouraged by White Paper 
rhetoric, between the 'most prestigious' institutions and places for the 'brightest' 
applicants, who in fact most often want to study subjects (arts, humanities and social 
sciences) threatened by the policy  precisely because they don't always require AAB 
and above. 
The Government's rationale for removing student number controls after only two 
years and encouraging a demand-led system (HM Treasury 2013) was that the SNC 
regime based on the two incentivised margins (high grade and quality and value) 
were merely a prelude to a completely free market. Though, of course, that was not 
the declared intention. Such intentions for the policy that were promoted in 2011 - 
the reduction of average fee levels and the greater likelihood of 'bright' applicants 
gaining places at the 'best' institutions - hardly had time to come to fruition within two 
years, particularly with such crude levers, and will probably leave little long term 
policy legacy. Plan B, to increase supply of places in order to finally meet and then 
exceed demand, may have the effect of reducing the average tuition fee over time if 
new entrant providers (NEPs) come to the market in sufficient numbers. Even here 
their impact may be limited to several niche areas of provision - accountancy, law, 
business studies - and to that extent they may represent competition on price for 
some post-1992s in those disciplines. It is, however, hard to see NEPs having a 
general impact on the sector, and their presence in the market may well lead to 
higher public expenditure in the short term (McGettigan 2013).   
As noted above, HEFCE was charged with findings ways to ensure that "the share of 
places liberated from number controls altogether rises year on year” only months 
before it was abandoned (BIS 2013; HEFCE 2013). It may well be that policymakers 
began to realise that further extensions to the high grades margin were impossible 
given the 'shrunken core' of only 20% of places in the second year of operation. 
Therefore it must therefore be doubted whether the original plan of expanding the 
21 
 
margin "year on year" (BIS 2011b para 4.18) was ever viable, yet it was essential to 
the leverage effect that was designed to redistribute students from least to most 
prestigious institutions and to differentiate fees.  
Those we interviewed during the autumn of 2013 hoped for stability rather than any 
changes to the regime, as did university Vice Chancellors in a more recent survey 
who are reportedly far more wary than previously of governmental interventions in 
the HE market (PA Consulting 2014). The abolition of number controls and 
introduction of a demand-led system from 2015-16 does not offer the prospect of 
stability, but will allow institutions to return, if they wish, to their pre-2012/13 
trajectories or indeed to expand any areas of provision that best reflects their 
institutional mission.  
Post-1992 institutions were less directly affected by the high grades element of the 
SNC regime, but by reacting to the longer term marketisation agenda continued the 
relentless drive 'up market' in order to justify higher fees- aided by the maintenance 
of high demand for their provision. The mere threat that students with high grades 
would be lost in the future was enough to stimulate additional fear among our post-
1992 respondents. This in turn fuelled the scramble for many post-1992s to 'become 
a top-50 institution' (in Times Higher Education UK league tables) as demonstrated 
by entry grades, NSS scores and employability outcomes (DLHE scores). Post-
1992s were actually supported in part of their 'upward mobility' mission by being able 
to easily divest themselves of much of their sub-degree and part-time provision to FE 
colleges, in turn grateful for the opportunity to bid for and receive HEFCE numbers 
directly (Taylor and McCaig 2014). Thus the competitive pressure of the 'quality and 
value' margin for those providing HE for less than £7,500 (designed of course to 
have a downward effect on average fee levels) in fact had the opposite effect: 
average tuition fees for 2014/15 were £8,600 and will be £8,781 in 2016-17 (OFFA 
2015). 
However the wider marketisation trends do continue to threaten the social justice 
mission of widening participation, long the raison d'etre of many post-1992 
institutions. This is partly because such institutions now feel they have a different set 
of policy goals and partly because the drive 'up-market' in league table terms has 
impacted on mature and part-time students due to the shift away from sub-degree 
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and vocational programmes. Paradoxically, the post-1992 sector may become less 
diverse (in terms of its programme offer and its student body) as a result of a trend to 
further marketisation - a process, less we forget, that was rationalised as beneficial 
differentiation.     
14. Bibliography   
An Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance. 2010. 
Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education (The Browne Report). 
Bekhradnia, B. 2003. Widening Participation and Fair Access: An Overview of the 
Evidence, HEPI, February 2003  
 
BIS. 2011a. The National Scholarship Programme – Year One. Press Release. 10 
February 2011. 
BIS. 2011b. Students at the heart of the system. TSO. July 2011. 
BIS. 2013. David Willetts: Speech to the Higher Education Funding Council for 
England Conference 2013, 18th April 2013, Imperial College London 
Brown, R & Scott, P. 2009. The Role of the Market in Higher Education, Higher 
Education Policy Institute 
Collini, S. 2012. What are Universities For? London: Penguin. 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES). 2006. Grant Letter from the Secretary of 
State. 31 January. London: DfES. 
 
Dodds, A. 2011. The British higher education funding debate: the perils of ‘talking 
economics’ London Review of Education, Vol. 9, No. 3, November 2011, 317–331 
 
Furedi, F. 2012. Satisfaction and its discontents. The Times Higher Education. 8 
March 2012. Available from: http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/419238.article 
[date accessed: 10th October 2014]. 
Grove, J. 2013. Post-92s poised to benefit from growth in ABB-equivalent numbers. 
The Times Higher Education. 23 September 2013. 
23 
 
HEFCE. 1994. Overview of Recent Developments in HE by Professor Graeme 
Davies, Chief Executive, HEFCE. M2/94 
HEFCE. 2000 Diversity in higher education: HEFCE policy statement, Bristol, 
HEFCE 2000/33 
HEFCE. 2010. Trends in young participation in higher education: core results for 
England. HEFCE January 2010/03. 
HEFCE. 2011. AAB+ modelling. HEFCE 2011/20 Annexe D. 
HEFCE. 2012. Formative Evaluation of the National Scholarship Programme. Report 
to HEFCE by CFE and the Widening Participation Research Centre, Edge Hill 
University, May 2012. 
HEFCE. 2013a. Higher Education in England: Impact of the 2012 reforms. October 
2013. 
HEFCE. 2013b. Policy Guide: Student numbers and high grades. June 2013. 
Available from: 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/whatwedo/lt/howfund/studentgrades/#d.en.76417 [10 
October 2014]. 
HEFCE. 2013c. Trends in young participation in higher education: core results for 
England. HEFCE January 2013/28 
HEFCE. 2013d. Student number controls: Outcomes of consultation on 
arrangements for 2014/15 onwards. HEFCE September 2013/20 
HEFCE. 2015. The Second Intentions After Graduation Survey. HEFCE February 
2015 https://www.hefce.ac.uk/analysis/Overview/ (accessed April 2015)  
HM Treasury. 2013. Autumn Statement 2013. Command 8747. December 2013. 
Maringe, F & Foskett, N. 2009. “I can survive on jam sandwiches for the next three 
years”: The impact of the new fees regime on students’ attitudes to HE and debt, 
International Journal of Educational Management, Vol. 23 Iss 2 pp. 145 - 160 
 
Matthews, D. 2013. Curnock Cook tells elite of leaner ABB catches ahead. Times 
Higher Education. 5 September 2013. 
24 
 
McCaig, C. 2000. Preparing for Government: Education policymaking in the Labour 
Party, PhD Thesis, University of Sheffield. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/5657/ 
McCaig, C. and Adnett, N. 2009. English Universities, Additional Fee Income and 
Access Agreements: their impact on Widening Participation and Fair Access. British 
Journal of Education Studies. Vol. 57, No.1 March 2009, pp.18-36. 
McCaig, C. 2011a. Access agreements, widening participation and market 
positionality: enabling student choice? In Molesworth, M., Nixon, L. and Scullion, R. 
(eds) The Marketisation of Higher Education and the Student as Consumer. London 
and New York: Routledge. Chapter 10, pp.115-128. 
McCaig, C. 2011b. "Trajectories of higher education system differentiation: structural 
policymaking and the impact of tuition fees in England and Australia" in the Special 
Issue of the Journal of Education and Work: ‘National Structural Higher Education 
Policy and Politics in Times of Globalization and their effects on social inequality’, 
Vol. 24, Nos. 1–2, February–April 2011, 7–25. 
McCaig, C. 2014. The retreat from Widening Participation? The National Scholarship 
Programme and new Access Agreements in English higher education, Studies in 
Higher Education. Published online 9th June 2014 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03075079.2014.916672.  
McCaig, C. 2015. The Impact of the Changing English Higher Education Marketplace 
on Widening Participation and Fair Access: Evidence from a Discourse Analysis of 
Access Agreements, Widening Participation and Lifelong Learning, Volume 17, Issue 
1, March 2015 
McGettigan, A. 2013. The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and Future of 
Higher Education. London: Pluto Press. 
Molesworth, M., Nixon, L. and Scullion, R. (eds). 2011. The Marketisation of Higher 
Education and the Student as Consumer. London and New York: Routledge. 
Morgan, J. 2013. Winners emerge in tug-of-war for ABB students. Times Higher 
Education, 12 September 2013.  
25 
 
Office for Fair Access. 2010. What more can be done to widen access at selective 
universities? OFFA. April 2010. 
Office for Fair Access. 2011. How to Produce an Access Agreement for 2012–13: 
Guidance. Bristol: OFFA. 
Office for Fair Access. 2015 Access agreements for 2016-17: key statistics and 
analysis. Outcomes and data tables Bristol: OFFA 2015/16. 
 
OECD. 2013. Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2013-en   
PA Consulting. 2014. Here be Dragons: how universities are navigating the 
uncharted waters of higher education, PA Knowledge Limited 2014, London. 
Shattock, M. 2008. The Change from Private to Public Governance of British Higher 
Education: Its Consequences for Higher Education Policy Making 1980-2006. Higher 
Education Quarterly. Vol. 62, No.3, July 2008. 
Taylor, C. and McCaig, C. 2014. Evaluating the impact of number controls, choice 
and competition: an analysis of the student profile and the student learning 
environment in the new higher education landscape, Higher Education Academy, 
York, August 2014. 
https://www.heacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Impact%20of%20number
%20controls%20choice%20and%20competition.pdf 
The Russell Group. 2011. Informed Choices. 
UCAS. 2013. 2013 Application Cycle: End of Cycle Report. UCAS Analysis and 
Research. December 2013. 
 
 
 
 
